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Abstract: Chomsky's KNoWLEooE oF LANGUAGE addresses certain conceptual 
questions about the foundations of generative linguistics that center on a 
'skeptical paradox' that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Chomsky's 
discussion offers an extended defense of his psychological conception of 
grammar against this challenge. This essay argues that Chomsky's response 
to the skeptical paradox is inadequate, but instructively so. The inadequacies 
of Chomsky's reply surface as a destructive dilemma for the psycholinguist 
conceptually committed to the generative paradigm in such a way as to 
reveal a conceptual incoherence in that paradigm. Specifically, the essay 
exhibits the dilemma as it arises for the performance theory of Berwick and 
Weinberg (1986). While modification of the philosophical foundations of 
generative linguistics may show the worltlng psycholinguist the way out of 
the dilemma, this essay leaves the dispute unresolved, making only the 
negative point. 
1. Introduction 
In KNoWLEDGE oF LANGUAGE, Noam Chomsky (1986) focuses attention on three 
questions that are fundamental to generative linguistics conceived as a branch of 
psychology. The questions are: 
I. What constitutes knowledge of language? 
II. How is knowledge of language acquired? 
III. How is knowledge of language put to use? (1986:3) 
Questions (I) and (III) are striking insofar as providing an adequate response to each 
is as much a philosophical as a linguistic project and touch on traditional 
philosophical issues concerning the nature of mind, language, and thought. In the 
context of articulating his response to (III), Chomsky discusses the so called 
'skeptical paradox' that Saul Kripke attributes to Ludwig Wittgenstein in ON RULES 
AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1984). Chomsky takes this paradox to pose a deep challenge 
to the philosophical foundations of psychological linguistics. 
The objectives of this essay are twofold. First, it aims to make clear the 
foundational philosophical challenge the skeptical paradox poses for linguistics. 
Secondly, it attempts to evaluate the force and adequacy of Chomsky's replies to 
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this challenge. I shall argue that Chomsky's response does not address the central 
charge that there are conceptual inadequacies in linguistics conceived as a branch of 
psychology. While I think that the prospects for finding a solution to the paradox 
are reasonably good, it is not within the scope of this essay to articulate what I 
think is the most promising solution. I leave the dispute unresolved, having made 
only the negative point 
2. The Skeptical Paradox 
The skeptical paradox that Kripke atuibutes to Wittgenstein (hereafter 
Kriptenstein1) is a family of arguments in the form of a reductio ad absurdwn. 
Throughout his exposition of the Wittgensteinian texts, Kripke focuses on the idea 
that word meaning and denotation is rule-governed. The paradox, however, is 
perfectly general in the sense that a member of the family of arguments applies to 
any behavior that is alleged to be rule-governed. The version of the paradox that 
wm interest us is displayed below. 
The Paradox 
(1) Jones knows a language L by being in competence state S. 
'-­
(2) If Jones knows L by being in competence state S, there must be some 
fact about Jones that constitutes his being in S that justifies claims 
that he is in that state. 
(3) There is no neutrally specifiable2 fact about Jones that constitutes his 
being in S and that justifies claims that he is in that state. 
(4) Hence, it is not the case that Jones knows a language L by being in 
state S. 
(5) (1) and (4) are incompatible. 
1 In ON RllLllS AND PluvATB LANGUAGE, Saul Kripke presents a forceful 
interpretation of arguments found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Plm.osoPiucAL 
INVESTIGAnONS and RBMARxs ON THE FoUNDAnONS OF MATHEMAncs. In KNoWLBDGB OF 
LANouAcm, Chomsky's primary concern is with the argument that Kripke atuibutes to 
Wittgenstein and eschews discussion of the exegetical question whether .Kripke's 
Wittgenstein adequately represents Wittgenstein. In this paper, we shall follow 
Chomsky and concern ourselves only with the force of Kripke's reading of 
Wittgenstein for linguistics in the generative paradigm. 
2 The specification of the fact that constitutes the grasp of a rule must provide 
non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions that do not assume that what 
constitutes using a rule has already been explicate4_. 
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All versions of the paradox assume (1) and (2). (3) is established by argument. 
The first premise attributes a psychologically real competence state to a speaker. (2) 
unpacks necessary conditions for that attribution. It is assumed that the facts that 
constitute S also justify attribution of S to a speaker. 
Given the ruling philosophical realist idea that psychological state attributions 
are fact stating, the skeptical paradox challenges the philosopher cum linguist to 
specify or describe the kind of thing, at a high level of generality, that constitutes 
such a state. The demand seems fair, if the philosopher/linguist holds that there 
must be facts that constitute S, it is fair to ask him to say what kind of thing those 
facts are. 
In its paradigmatic and most analytical form, the task of philosophical 
semantic theories has been understood as one of providing an analysis or 
informative explanation of what constitutes meaning and reference. The idea is that 
an adequate philosophical semantic theory will answer the question: in virtue of 
what does a token of 'A' mean A? The question is an ontological question about 
speaker meaning and understanding of meaning. An adequate ontological analysis 
or explanation will provide a non-trivial specification or description of the facts, 
states of affairs or states of mind that constitute internal representation and use of 
rules, It is assumed that an answer to the ontological question will also specify the 
epistemological ground of rule attributions. Of course, such a description will not 
describe specific experimental effects, but it will answer the general question of 
what state S is in a way that allows experimental data to be interpreted to warrant 
the attribution of S. That there is a neutral description of these rules and their use 
(i.e., a description that does not somehow assume the notion of rule-following) is 
the idea that is the target of the reductio. ' 
Kripke makes the assumption (for reductio) explicit as follows: 
By means of my external symbolic representation and my 
internal mental representation, I 'grasp' the rule for addition. 
One point is crucial to my grasp of this rule. Although I 
myself have computed only finitely many sums in the past, the 
rule determines my answer for indefinitely many sums that I 
have never previously considered. This is the whole point of 
the notion that in learning to add I grasp a rule: my past 
intentions regarding addition determine a unique answer for 
indefinitely many new cases in the future. (1984:8) 
The point of claiming that meaning and knowledge of language are 
constituted by the grasp of rules is to capture the idea that linguistic behavior is 
normative. This notion is specified by the following adequacy conditions. 
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Adequacy Conditions on descriptions of competence states: 
Condition A: Internally represented rules determine (in some sense) 
future and as yet unconsidered linguistic behavior. 
Condition B: These rules are uniquely' represented. 
When a philosopher claims that linguistic behavior is normative, he typically 
means (at least) that it is behavior of which it makes sense to claim that it is 
correct or incorrect. Of a nonnative behavior it is intelligible to say that it was 
mistaken or in error. Inextricably bound with the idea of a normative phenomenon 
is the idea of. a unique standard in virtue of which that phenomenon is judged 
permissible or not. Of course this idea of linguistic normativity contrasts with the 
linguist's standard conception of the prescriptivity of grammars. Introductory 
~guistics textbooks take pains to deny that linguists' grammars are prescriptive and 
deny that grammars (not behaviors) are nonnative. The import is to distinguish 
between ·the grammars of scientific linguistics and old fashioned grammarians' 
grammars. There is no conflict between what the philosopher claims is normative 
and what the linguist claims is not normative, since behaviors are not grammars. 
· Rule-governed behavior contrasts sharply with behavior that is merely 
rule-conforming. The description of rule-conforming behavior need satisfy neither 
Adequacy Condition A nor B. For example, the behavior of bodies conforms with 
Newton's Laws, which are rules of a sort, but bodies do not make mistakes if their 
behavior does not conform with those laws. Moreover, by continuing in its orbit, 
Neptune merely conforms with Newton's laws and does not apply an internal 
representation of them. Satisfaction of Adequacy Conditions A and B captures the 
notion that linguistic behavior is governed by internally represented rules. What is 
wanted in response to the paradox is an informative explanation of what it is to 
internally represent and apply a rule that does not assume that this notion has been 
satisfactorily explicated. A neutral description shows (3) is false. 
Computational theories of mind can profitably be seen as attempts to provide 
neutral descriptions of what it is to follow a rule. For example, in the second 
chapter of THE LANGUAGE OF ThOUGIIT (1975) Jerry Fodor motivates his appeal to the 
computer metaphor with a discussion of Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox. The idea, 
of course, is · that a computational theory of mind can neutrally specify facts in 
virtue of which a speaker internally represents and uses rules. Having a "language 
3 'Unique' should not be read here to exclude the possibility of genuinely 
ambiguous syntactical tokens. Chomsky often states this adequacy condition by 
claiming that the rules must be correct. For example, he writes that the idea of an 
internal grammar or I-language is correct, while in the case of an E-language there 
.is no issue of correctness or incorrectness (1986:26). Alternatively, he claims that a 
generative grammar "pmports to depict exactly what one knows when one knows a 
language" (1986:24). 
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of thought" i.e., a language that the machine is built to use, and something like a 
compiler that translates from natural languages into a brain code, constitutes a 
neutral description of rules and their use.• While Pod.or's suggested solution is well 
worth discussion, we shall not pursue it here. Our concern is specifically with 
Chomsky's views in KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE where he is not concerned with 
computational theories of what it is to mentally represent and use a rule (1986:239) 
So far, we have said nothing about the argument for (3), the claim that there 
is no fact specifiable in neutral terms that constitutes the grasp of a rule so that 
Adequacy Conditions A and B are satisfied. The argument for (3) is an argument 
by elimination. Kriptenstein considers and rejects a variety of candidates which, if 
adequate, would show that (3) is false. In general, the candidates fall into two 
categories based on the way they fail as solutions to the paradox. The first group 
of candidates (mental images, experiential states, dispositions) fail because they do 
not satisfy Adequacy Conditions A and B. In consequence, such candidate solutions 
fail to capture the relevant properties of linguistic behavior. Kripke's arguments 
against the idea that linguistic behavior can be explicated in tenns of a speaker's 
dispositions are reminiscent of Chomsky's attack on Skinner. The second group of 
4 Too briefly, the debate with respect to whether computational or language of 
thought solutions to the paradox are adequate focuses on whether a causal 
description of mental content is adequate. For given a description of the content of 
mental representations and their use in purely causal (neutral tenns), what Fodor 
calls the disjunction problem arises. In PsYCHosEMANTICS (1987:102) Fodor describes 
the disjunction problem as follows. 
We can put it that a viable causal theory of content has to 
acknowledge two kinds of cases where there are disjoint 
causally sufficient conditions for the tokenings of a symbol: 
the case where the content of the symbol is disjunctive ('A' 
expresses the. property of being (A v B)) and the case where 
the content of the symbol is not disjunctive and some 
· tokenings are false ('A' expresses the property of being A, and 
B-caused 'A' tokenings misrepresent) .... 
The disjunction problem is extremely robust; so far as I 
know, it arises in one guise or another for every causal theory 
of content that has been thus far proposed. 
The disjunction problem is the problem of distinguishing the case where 'A' 
correctly represents (A v B) and the case where 'A' misrepresents B, because it was 
caused by B. The problem arises because descriptions of mental representations 
(couched in purely causal tenns) do not satisfy the adequacy conditions (much 
discussed in text above) on nonnative or rule-governed phenomena. Mental content 
like linguistic knowledge is both productive and unique in the relevant respect. The 
disjunction problem shows that a purely causal theory of content cannot capture the 
notion of a mistaken representation. 
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candidates, · which includes linguists' descriptions of competence states, i.e., 
grammars, fails to show that (3) is false, because they do not neutrally describe 
internally represented rules and their use. 
If my exposition of the paradox has been clear, then it should be obvious 
why. the typical description of a competence state does not adequately neutrally 
describe the fact that constitutes an internally represented rule (or system of rules). 
What is wanted is an account of what it is for an individual to represent and apply 
rules in terms that make no appeal to· the notion of a mentally represented rule. 
The explanandum must not appear in the explanans on pain of circularity. Our 
conception of a typical description of such competence states assumes the very idea 
that is to be explained -- that a speaker represents and uses rules. Hence, a 
competence state as typically conceived and described begs the very question at 
issue. 
To be sure, Chomskian competence states satisfy Adequacy Conditions A and 
B. Such states are claimed to be explanatorily adequate, and not merely 
descriptively adequate and so satisfy Adequacy Condition B. Moreover, it is 
typically claimed that such states and their description account for the phenomena of 
linguistic productivity and so by their very nature satisfy Adequacy Condition A. 
But it is not a solution to the skeptical paradox insofar as it does not describe a 
fact in neutral terms that shows (3) of the paradox to be false. 
Kriptenstein puts the point this way: 
...our understanding of 'competence' is dependent on our 
understanding of 'following a rule' ... Only after the skeptical 
problem about rules has been resolved can we then define 
'competence' in terms of rule following. . . Although the 
remarks in the text warn against the use of the 'competence' 
notion as a solution to our problem, in no way are they 
arguments against the notion itself. Nevertheless, given the 
skeptical nature of Wittgenstein's solution to his problem ... , 
it is clear that if Wittgenstein's standpoint is accepted, the 
notion of 'competence' will be seen in a radically different 
way from the way it is implicitly seen in much of the 
linguistics literature. For if statements attributing 
rule-following are neither regarded as stating facts, nor to be 
thought of. as explaining behavior, it would seem that the use 
of the ideas of rules and of competence in linguistics needs 
serious reconsideration. (1984:31) 
If Kripke is right, then if the linguist is going to resist the contradiction at (5) -­
that. a speaker both knows L by being in S and does not know L by being in S, 
then he must do so by denying (2). It is with the rejection of (2) that the paradox 
becomes interesting. 
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(2) claims that a speaker is in S only if there is a fact (specifiable in neutral 
terms) that constitutes that state, satisfies Adequacy Conditions A and B, and 
justifies attribution of S to the speaker. The second premise will be false just in 
case speakers represent and use rules (in some sense), but one of the following four 
responses to the paradox is viable. 
Four Possible Responses to the Paradox: 
Response A: the facts that constitute S do not satisfy Adequacy Conditions 
A and B, or 
Response B: the facts that constitute S do not justify or warrant competence 
state attributions, or . 
Response C: the facts that constitute S cannot be specified or described in 
other terms, or 
Response D: there are no facts at all that constitute S. 
Since competence states (for Chomsky) are described by appeal to rules, the linguist 
must claim that (2) not (3) is false if he is to avoid .the antinomy at (5). In itself, 
rejecting (2) is not especially problematic prima facie. For there are four ways the 
linguist can avoid the conclusion that a speaker both is and is not in S. Some of 
these alternatives are more attractive than others, but the antinomy is well worth 
avoiding. 
It will be useful to attend to exactly what the linguist accepts should he 
embrace one of the Responses A - D. To begin, consider Response A. Accepting 
that the facts that constitute competence states do not satisfy Adequacy Conditions 
A and B entails giving up either the idea that the rules that constitute competence 
states are unique or that linguistic knowledge is. productive. Neither alternative is 
acceptable. Suppose, for example, that two rules of S, R and R', when applied to a 
string P assign a different status to P (e.g. noise and acceptable), so the rules of S 
are not unique. If both R and R' are claimed to be the standard that constitutes S 
in virtue of which P has the status it has, then S is no standard. Non-unique 
standards are not standards at all. Thus, the Adequacy Conditions seem essential 
for psychological -linguistics. 
Alternatively, the linguist might consider rejecting Adequacy Condition A as 
a means of accepting Response A. In this case he would reject the idea that 
knowledge of language is productive in the sense that what people know when they 
know a language applies to expressions they have never heard or previously 
considered. This option is not open to one who claims that language is 
rule-governed. Accepting Response A by rejecting Adequacy Conditions A or B 
would require a revision in the typical conception of competence. 
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Alternatively, consider Response B. The Chomskian idea is that facts about 
the speaker's competence states ( e.g. psycholinguistic evidence) justify the attribution 
of such states to speakers. If the linguist accepts Response B, he denies that claim. 
If one wants to take psycholinguistic evidence to be evidence about competence 
states and the use of rules, then one cannot accept Response B. 
Next, consider Response C. In accepting Response C the linguist accepts 
that. facts that constitute S cannot be described without appeal to internally 
represented rules. The advocate of such a view might claim that the facts in virtue 
of which· Jones knows L by being in S are brute linguistic facts that cannot be 
described in other terms. Such a view suggests that there is a wide and 
unbridgeable gulf between linguistic facts and physical and chemical facts, for 
example, which are specifiable without appeal to internally represented rules. Prima 
f acie it also conflicts with naturalism, the view that linguistic facts are part of the 
natural biological order. Indeed, the view seems to entail a form of linguistic 
dualism on which the facts of linguistics are a sui generis kind of entity -- an 
internal-rule-fact. 
Finally, accepting Response D entails that whatever represented rules are they 
are not psychologically real phenomena. In consequence of Response D, competence 
state attributions are not literally true or false, although they may be useful for 
some purpose. The linguist who · accepts Response D adopts a form of 
instrumentalism about competence states. 
At this point, the Chomskian linguist is faced with four possible responses to 
the skeptical paradox. From what we have said so far, Response C is the most 
attractive alternative --but much more on this below. 
3. Chomsky's Response to Kriptenstein 
In KNoWLEDGE oF LANGUAGE, Chomsky argues that the skeptical paradox does 
not show that "the notion of competence [must] be seen in a light radically different 
from the way that it is seen in much of the linguistics literature".5 Chomsky's 
defense consists in accepting Response A and Response C but explicitly denying 
Response B and Response D. 
5 In Chapter 4 of KNoWLEDGE oF LANGUAGE Chomsky focuses a great · deal of 
attention to arguing against the skeptical solution that Kripke attributes to 
Wittgenstein; Wittgenstein's solution to the paradox, like Chomsky's, is skeptical 
insofar as it accepts that (3) is true but (2) is false. Kripke claims that the thesis 
that there is such a thing as a private language follows as a corollary from 
Wittgenstein's own skeptical solution. Whether Wittgenstein's skeptical solution is 
adequate and whether the impossibility of a private language (whatever that is) does 
so follow is independent of the challenge that the paradox raises for the generative 
linguist. 
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We have already noted that as a matter of logic, the generative linguist must 
accept at least one of the above disjuncts. In this section, I shall argue that it is 
not open to the Chomskian linguist to accept Response A and that if Response C is 
accepted, the problem of saying what it is to use one rule rather than another 
resurfaces in the project of formulating performance models of competence theories. 
When Kriptenstein claims that linguistic behavior is normative, what is 
claimed is that the Adequacy Conditions apply. In KNoWLEDGE oF LANGUAGE, Chomsky 
explicitly argues that linguistic phenomena are not normative (as per Response A) 
and urges that all issues of correct and incorrect performance can be 'dropped' by 
considering 'normal'6 cases of attributing rules to native speakers. Chomsky 
illustrates the claim by observing that we do say that a child's internal rules are 
incorrect, but we are unlikely to say of adult (normal) native speakers that their 
rules are incorrect. So of children who overgeneralire and say "sleeped" Chomsky 
writes: 
we will say that their rules are "incorrect" meaning different 
from those of the adult community or a selected portion of it. 
Here we invoke the normative teleological aspect of the 
common sense notion of language. (1986:227) 
By contrast, we do not say of the adult Irishman who says "There himself goes 
down the road," that his internal rules are incorrect. According to Chomsky, the 
generative linguist can embrace Response A, because the linguists' theory merely 
describes a speaker's internally represented rules. 
Accepting Response A as a way to avoid the antinomy is fundamentally 
misguided. First, what is at issue (with respect to the paradox) is the normative 
status of linguistic behavior, not the normative status of the description of the 
competence state. For example, an anthropologist may claim to describe a system of 
moral rules in a particular community. While the anthropologist's description is not 
normative, what he describes, if accurate, will characterire · morally permissible and 
impermissible (morally normative) behavior in that community. Similarly, the 
linguists' competence theory describes a competence state, nevertheless the 
hypothesized internally represented rules characterire the sentences of L which are 
linguistically (not morally) permissible or impermissible. Make no mistake, our 
concern is not with what one calls this interesting property of linguistic behavior. 
What it is important to .see is that one of the primary reasons to posit internal rules 
that are used by speakers is to explicate what the philosopher (erroneously if you 
like) calls linguistic normativity. If one accepts Response A and so denies that the 
One wonders. what Chomsky means by 'normal' here. One suspects that he 
means something like 'in cases where error in performance is not at issue', but then 
it is trivially and uninterestingly true that issues of distinguishing correct and 
incorrect rule attributions do not arise in those cases. 
6 
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facts that constitute internal rules and their application must satisfactorily explain 
linguistic productivity or provide a standard of performance, then one rejects the 
idea that language is a rule-governed phenomenon. Accepting Response A entails 
denying distinctive characteristics of the phenomenon that one wants to explain. 
Secondly, Chomsky's point that linguistic competence is not a normative 
notion (because we would say of the child that his rules are incorrect but would not 
say of the Irishman that his rules are incorrect) is moot. What is relevant is that if 
the child overgeneralizes the use of a rule, for example, that Verb+PAST --> 
Verb+/d/, then it is correct for the child to say "sleeped". What is correct or 
incorrect is behavior relative to internally represented rules not descriptions of those 
rules. In consequence, Chomsky's attempts to avoid the paradox by claiming the 
generative linguist can coherently accept Response A is not persuasive. Indeed, if 
successful, his arguments would undermine his own performance/competence 
distinctions7 in the sense that a competence state provides a standard of performance 
and explicates linguistic productivity. 
Chomsky explicitly advocates two routes out of the paradox, for he also 
endorses the idea that the linguist can avoid the antinomy at (5) by claiming that 
(2) is false in virtue of there being sui generis linguistic facts. I shall argue that if 
the generative linguist embraces this claim (Response C) the troubles of the 
skeptical paradox resurface, but now as a problem for the psycholinguist. In short, 
my thesis is that the challenge that the skeptical paradox presents for the linguist is 
a bump-under-the-rug phenomenon. If the linguist attempts to detoxify the paradox 
by claiming (2) is false in virtue of accepting Response C, then the paradox revisits 
itself on the working psycholinguist. But first, we need a clearer idea of what these 
sui generis rule-facts are supposed to be like. 
Chomsky has recently taken to using the neologism 'I-language' to refer to 
what he previously called competence states. For Chomsky, an I-language is "some 
7 Space does not permit consideration of the many versions of the 
performance/competence distinction as made by Chomsky in the course of his long 
and illustrious career. Suffice it to say that at one time Chomsky seemed to think 
that a competence theory was to be distinguished from a performance theory only 
insofar as the competence theory required an idealization away from various 
interfering performance factors, e.g., memory limitations, background noise, etc. It 
is not clear that this notion of the competence/performance theory is normative in 
the sense I have been concerned with here. Linguistic normativity is at best a 
troublesome notion. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that either the philosopher 
of language or the linguist can live without it. The intuitive distinction between 
rule-conforming and rule-guided behavior seems cogent. If the linguists' theory 
does not capture the relevant features of the phenomena, then it seems that his 
theory simply does not explain something that needs to be explained. A full scale 
study of linguistic normativity in conjunction with an examination of various 
versions of the performance/competence distinction would be useful. 
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element of the mind of a person who knows a language, acquired by the learner, 
and used by the speaker."[1986:22) In particular, it is a second-order property of 
speaker's (non-neurophysiological?) mind. It is a "distinct level of things in the 
world", not to be explicated in causal terms. That an I-language is a second-order 
property of native speakers is not sufficient to secure the claim that facts about such 
competence states are uniquely linguistic. A second-order property is simply a 
property of the first-order properties of objects. For example, dispositional 
properties like solubility are second-order properties of objects. A salt crystal has 
the property of being soluble, and being soluble is a property of the first-order 
properties of the salt crystal. More specifically, being soluble is a property of the 
relative electro-static charge on sodium and chloride ions (a first-order property) in 
the presence of water molecules. But clearly, there is nothing uniquely linguistic 
about the second-order property of solubility. 
Claims about the psychological reality of grammars, for Chomsky, are 
formulated as claims about which grammar a speaker uses. In a characteristic. 
passage he writes: 
Statements about the I-language are true or false, much the 
same way statements about the chemical structure of benzene 
. . . are true or false. The I-language L may be used by a 
speaker but not the I-language L', even if the two generate 
the same class of expressions. (1986:37) 
The point that a grammar G is psychologically real in the sense that it is used by a 
speaker while the weakly equivalent G' is not is what makes the speaker of a 
language a rule-follower and rule-user and is what makes one description of a 
competence state psychologically real and the other not. 
We shall explore how accepting Response C raises difficulties for the 
psycholinguist by considering the case of the Derivational Theory of Complexity 
[DTCJ from the history of psycholinguistics. DTC was an early, if not the first, 
attempt to provide a performance model of the grammar outlined in AsPECTS OF THB 
THEORY OF SYNTAX with sufficient specificity and detail that Chomskian conjectures 
about the psychological reality of the so-called 'Standard Theory' could be tested 
(though some actual psycholinguistic uses of DTC preceded the publication of 
AsPECTS). DTC assumed the grammar (description of the I-language) of AsPECTS, and 
took on the assumption that the relation between that grammar and the parsing 
algorithm was transparent in the sense that the relation was isomorphic. The deep 
structure and surface structure of input strings was recovered by the parser which 
echoed the grammar, and the deep structure was derived from the surface structure 
by the application of 'inverse transformations'. DTC also assumed that each 
grammatical operation cost one unit of time and since the parser/grammar relation 
was one-to-orie the temporal cost of constructing the deep structures from surface 
structures was the sum of the number of the applications of rules necessary for the 
derivation of the sentence. There are more subtle versions of DTC, but all versions 
share the notion of a relatively transparent relation between linguistic rules and 
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psychological operations. The motto was one temporal unit for each rule 
application. 
Given the assumptions of OTC, the theory predicts that the. mapping from 
deep to surface structure for active sentences requires one fewer rule applications 
than passives, so it would 0take less time to parse actives than passives. Some very 
early evidence appeared to confirm, DTC (and the grammar of. Aspects). However, 
later experiments "found no C01Telation between sentence · processing time and the 
length of transformational ,derivation"." ·There are three possible retrenched versions 
of DTC: reject· the grammar, reject the assumption that the relation between the 
grammar and.-parser is-isomorphic, or reject the computational complexity measure. 
Each alternative has subsequently been attempted, but it is the second avenue of 
retrenchment that shall be of particular interest to us here. 
Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974) were the first to suggest that the transparent, 
isomorphic relation between the grammar and parser be revised. In place of the 
isomorphic relation they substituted "heuristic strategies", with the effect that· the 
subsequent perfotmance model reduced the online computation involved in sentence 
comprehension. Now at one level, the rejection by Fodor et. ·al. of the transparency 
assumption is a standard piece of ordinary science. In the face of disconfinning 
evidence for the favored theory, hang onto the theory and reject an auxiliary 
hypothesis. However, the retrenchment in this·case is self-defeating. Hone permits 
the adoption of any "heuristic strategy" as the posited relation· between the grammar 
and parser,• then virtually ·any. parser will model any set of rules. In this case, the 
parser/grammar relationship · is completely - unconstrained by the theory, and any 
sense in which the performance model· can. be used to test the psychological reality 
of the theory disappears. 
Cogniz.ant of the dlmgers heuristic grammar/parser n;lations pose for claims 
about the psychological reality of grammars, Berwick and Weinberg (1986) define a 
notion of grammatical covering in an· attempt to respond to the problem. Informally 
characterized, they claim that one grammar·G covers another G' if 
· '(1) both generate the same, language L(G) = L(G'), that .is the 
grammars are weakly equivalent;, and (2) we can find parses 
of strucbiral descriptions that·G' assigns to. sentences using G 
and then applying a "simple" or easily computed mapping to · 
the resulting output. (1986:79-80) 
. " Quott:iin Berwick and. Weinberg (1986:42) from Joan Bresnan, "A Realistic 
Trarisforinatioiial Grammar" . in M. Hal.le, J: Bresnan and G. Miller (Eds.) UNGUISTIC 
'fHEoRy AND PsYCHOUJGICAL REAurv (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978). 
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They cash out "simple" as follows; 
. . .[t]he usual definition of "simple" drawn from the formal 
literature is that of a string homomorphism. That is, if the 
parse of a sentence with respect to a grammar G is a string of 
numbers corresponding to the rules that were applied to 
generate the sentence under some arbitrary numbering of the 
rules of the grammar and some canonical mapping derivation 
sequence, the translation mapping that carries this string of 
numbers to a new string of numbers corresponding to the parse 
[under G'] must be a homomorphism under the concatenation. 
(1986:79-80) 
If G covers G', the grammars (or grammar and parser) are not merely weakly 
equivalent. The structure of the parse, but not the number of rule applicationl, is 
preserved under string homomorphism. The covering relationship, however, is 
weaker than strong equivalence and the transparency relation. In consequence, if 
computational cost measures are held constant, predictions of total time cost will 
vary radically from parser to parser. 
Recall that Chomsky defines psychological reality in terms of the use of a 
grammar -- applying internally represented rules. However, if we follow Berwick 
and Weinberg's elegant suggestion, we accept a notion of grammatical covering on 
which the description of the I-language, e.g., G, is not strongly equivalent to the 
parser, e.g., G', -- the used grammar. Once we do this, it is not easy to see what 
the idea of using the covering grammar comes to. By hypothesis, it is not the 
covering grammar, but G', the parser, that is used. Worse yet, there are indefinitely 
many parsers that are covered by the competence grammar. Are we to suppose that 
the speaker can use only one of these, or many? If we suppose speakers may 
implement more than one of the covered parsers, then temporal costs will vary for 
the same grammar (holding temporal cost measures constant) and strikingly different 
predictions follow from the same competence theory. [What empirical content 
would attach to the claim that the speaker uses one, rather than many of the 
covered parsers?] In this case the grammar no longer provides a standard of 
performance in terms of temporal cost and loses its ability to function as one needs 
a competence theory to function in the performance model. On the other hand, if 
we take the speaker to use just one of the parsers covered by the grammar, then 
there is no advantage in claiming that the competence grammar is used, although 
the parse is structurally homomorphic to the parse of the competence grammar had 
it been used. A further difficulty is that, ass11ming that the covering relation is 
symmetric, any given G' (the parser) might cover indefinitely many competence 
grammars, G. 
Berwick and Weinberg claim that loosening the relation between 
(competence) grammar and parser (performance grammar) provides the 
computational linguist with a performance model that has clear methodological 
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advantages. In response to the question "Why build a parser that is covered by a 
competence grammar?" they write: 
The answer is that by keeping the levels of grammar and 
algorithmic realization distinct, it is easier to determine just 
what is contributing to discrepancies between theory and 
surface facts. For instance, if levels are kept distinct, then 
one is able to hold the grammar constant and vary the 
machine architectures to explore the possibility of good fit 
between psycholinguistic evidence and model. Suppose these 
results came to naught. We can then try to vary machine 
architecture and covering mappings, still seeking model and 
data compatibility. . [M]odularity of explanation permits 
modularity of scientific investigation. (1986:80) 
As a methodological claim, the thesis is unassailable. If I understand Berwick and 
Weinberg correctly, their idea is that a modular conception of performance models 
facilitates the manipulation of elements of computational simulations of those 
models and promotes ease of identifying various models of the competence 
grammar. However, such methodological boons would issue from taking the 
covering grammar to identify a class of parsers. Berwick and Weinberg's response 
does not bear on the issue of what one could now mean by the psychological reality 
of the covering grammar. That distinguishing between a competence grammar (class 
of parsers) and a used parser is useful does not explicate what it could now mean 
to use the competence grammar. The use of a grammar, by hypothesis involves 
specific and determinate temporal costs, not a class of temporal costs for the same 
(grammatical) phenomenon. 
Let us rehearse where we have been. The initial idea was that internally 
representing rules was a sui generis fact about Jones (Response C) that could be 
embraced to support the falsity of (2) in the skeptical paradox. In order to develop 
a performance model of a competence theory which is taken to describe those brute 
linguistic rule-facts, one must posit a grammar parser relation. If the relation is 
supposed to be transparent and consistent with DTC, we have a clear (but 
non-neutral) description of what it is to use those rules -- the transparency relation. 
But the transparency relation has empirical difficulties, so a string homomorphism 
was postulated to gain its methodological advantages. But now conceptual problems 
arise and philosophical difficulties resurface concerning what it means to say that a 
speaker uses the competence grammar (not the parsing grammar) and that the 
competence grammar is psychologically real. If we say that a class of parsers are 
the facts in virtue of which the speaker is in S, then there is incompatible 
psycholinguistic evidence about those facts that will prima facie both support that a 
speaker is and is not in S. For each parser will provide a different standard with 
respect to time costs for the same phenomenon. Alternatively, if we say to use G 
is to use just one G' covered by G, then it seems that we would be just as well off 
to say that G' is the real fact of the matter, and G a useful means of identifying 
G', but is neither used by the speaker nor psychologically real. This latter 
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suggestion has been made by a. number of theorists and rejected by Chomsky (see, 
for example, Soames 1984). 
I have argued that if the linguist attempts to avoid the skeptical paradox that 
Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein along the lines Chomsky suggests in KNoWUIDGI! OF 
LANGUAGI!, then either he ends up rejecting the performance/competence distinction or 
(given the methodological requirements on a performance model) the paradox 
resurfaces for the psycholinguist in terms of saying what it is to use the competence 
grammar. If what I have argued is correct, then the alternative strategies open to 
the linguist for avoiding the paradox are to either claim Response D, that there is 
nothing about a speaker in virtue of which he uses one grammar rather than an 
other (i.e., linguists' competence state atttibutions are not fact stating), or Response 
B, that facts about competence states do not justify grammar attributions. Neither 
of these alternatives is acceptable, for both require considerable revision in the 
typical conception of competence. At least this is the situation unless the lingufst 
'can show (or plausibly hope) that there is a description of the facts that constitute 
what it is to use a rule in neutral terms. I have not, of course, addressed the issue 
of whether a neutral description of rule-following can be articulated by 
computational theories of mind. That is a distinct and very long story. 
While I do not think the skeptical paradox poses insuperable conceptual 
difficulties for generative linguistics (even if one does not embrace the language of 
thought hypothesis and the computational metaphor), I have attempted to show that 
there is a troublesome conceptual problem here. Surely one of the conceptual 
burdens of psycholinguistics is to say what constitutes the use of rules. The 
Wittgensteinian skeptical paradox makes explicit the conceptual difficulties inherent 
in that task. 
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